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WHAT KIND OF FREEDOM DOES RELIGION NEED?
Robin Lovin*
I take my role as the theologian here with some trepidation. What
I have to say is less specifically related to adjudication around First
Amendment issues, but I think it sets out some background issues
that need to be addressed in order to provide a more coherent un-
derstanding of how court decisions are related to religious issues. I
agree with Dean Edward Gaffney's suggestion that there is an obvi-
ous, historical answer to the question we are addressing - is the
First Amendment hostile to religion? 1 The First Amendment was
designed to be hostile to those kinds of religion that require estab-
lishment as a condition for their survival or prosperity. That was at
least one of the major motivations behind the framing of the First
Amendment.' So at that time, some Anglicans and some Congrega-
tionalists correctly perceived that this was a constitutional provision
directed against what they saw as essential to their religion.3 Later,
the Roman Catholic community went through a similar set of ques-
tions, and then developed a new assessment that at Vatican I1 be-
came normative for the Roman Catholic Church with regard to
church-state issues on a global basis. In those situations, first for
Protestants and then, later, for Catholics in the United States, these
religious communities learned that they could live without the estab-
lishment that they thought was essential at an earlier phase in their
religion. The success of the First Amendment might indeed be mea-
* Dean and Professor of Ethics and Society at the Theological School, Drew University.
I. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
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2. Scott Titshaw, Note, Sharpening the Prongs of the Establishment Clause: Applying Stricter
Scrutiny to Majority Religions, 23 GA. L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1989). See also David C. Williams
& Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 852
(1991).
3. Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 455, 513 (1991). See also Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United
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sured by the fact that under the constitutional conditions the First
Amendment creates, religions over a period of time seem to adapt
and to prosper. Indeed, they eventually develop their own religious
arguments for the kind of disestablished condition the First Amend-
ment requires. There are certainly dissents that could be entered
against that kind of interpretation of our history, and there are obvi-
ous questions about how far it can be pushed. Could a Muslim fun-
damentalist group, for example, go through the same kind of histori-
cal development that Protestants and Catholics have gone through
in this country with regard to religious establishment? But I will
leave those details aside for the, moment and suggest that one obvi-
ous way of thinking about the First Amendment with respect to reli-
gion is simply to join in the kind of general celebration that was
characteristic of American public life about two or three decades
ago - a general celebration of the prospering and growth of reli-
gion under the disestablished conditions the First Amendment
creates.
Why then do we end up raising questions about hostility to reli-
gion in the First Amendment, and raising again a set of questions
about the prosperity and viability of religious communities in the
constitutional context the First Amendment creates? Well, I think
that the question we are answering today, whether the First Amend-
ment is hostile to religion, takes a very different form from the ear-
lier question of whether religions can prosper without some kind of
establishment or state support. The question has come to mean: Is
freedom of religion inimical to authentic religious life? The new
skepticism about the First Amendment comes from those who are
ambiguous or who are ambivalent about the religious effects of reli-
gious freedom, those who do not see religious freedom securing the
prosperity and growth of religious communities, but see it creating
communities that are captive and docile to the wishes of a secular
state. Here, of course, Stanley Hauerwas is the prime example in
contemporary religious life and contemporary theology.5
The question, then, is: What notion of religion is this that raises
this new set of questions? We understood the notion of religion that
had a problem with the First Amendment with respect to establish-
ment. What notion of religion has a problem with respect to reli-
gious freedom? It is certainly a kind of religion that has antecedents
5. See STANLEY HAUERWAS. A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE
CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC (1981).
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in Western Christian and particularly Protestant traditions - in the
Anabaptist movements, in the so-called left wing of the Reforma-
tion. There is a wonderful story in Roland Bainton's history of war
and peace in Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace' about the
Anabaptist community that was persecuted from place to place in
Central Europe and finally found themselves living in the territory
of a Count who thought these were simple, industrious, good folk.7
This Count offered to protect them, but they responded that they
would rather move on to some place where they could be perse-
cuted. 8 Their understanding of the appropriate relationship with the
state did not permit that kind of protection. So there are religious
antecedents to the questions about religious freedom that Hauerwas
and others are raising today. But I suggest to you that Hauerwas's
questions are distinctly postmodern kinds of questions about religion
and religious freedom. (It seems to me that the fact that Stanley
Hauerwas has ended up in Durham, North Carolina, as the next-
door neighbor of a postmodern, deconstructionist, literary theorist 9
is probably the best evidence that we can find for a valid cosmologi-
cal argument for the existence of God. This could not have hap-
pened in a random universe.)
So what's happening here? In religious thought about the First
Amendment, a question about freedom has displaced the question
about establishment. In other words, a postmodern question, a ques-
tion of freedom, has displaced a distinctly modern one, a question of
establishment. Let me expand on the difference between these two
kinds of questions. The modern question, the question that raised
the issue of establishment, was a question about whether society
could exist with two competing centers that demanded unlimited
loyalty. Now, note that that was a distinctly modern question. If you
read Harold Berman's analysis of the development of law and the
relationship between religion and state in the Middle Ages, 10 you
discover that those questions of competing ultimate loyalties did not
arise in that modern way during that period. The medieval legal
6. ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL
SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION 156-57 (1960).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 157.
9. The author is referring to Stanley Fish, a professor of English and law at Duke University,
who champions the postmodern deconstructionist theory.
10. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND THE REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
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system developed with multiple overlapping jurisdictions, which
would sometimes come into severe conflict with one another."1 But
the sharply posed philosophical question of whether we could have
competing centers of ultimate loyalty is a distinctly modern one. It
arises as we move out of that medieval period and into a period
when the modern state is forming itself and thinking about how it is
going to handle those questions of competing loyalties. There was a
variety of resolutions that were posed to that question of competing
ultimate loyalties. Thomas Hobbes and Marsilius of Padua had one
kind of resolution: You have to concentrate all authority in the
state, you cannot have more than one center of power and author-
ity,12 so the person who controls the civil society has to be able to
compel religious assent as well. But the resolution that prevailed in
our constitutional system, and the one that has prevailed in the
modern world generally, was the later one of Locke and then of Jef-
ferson and the Founders of our constitutional system.' 3 It stated
that we deal with these competing centers of loyalty by establishing
the supremacy of an individual autonomous conscience that will ad-
judicate between those competing claims. 4 So the modern answer to
the question about the relationship between the state and religion -
and those competing centers of loyalty - is that we can have both
civil and religious communities and powers because really neither
one of them is ultimate. What is ultimate is the power of reason
located in the individual, autonomous, rational person.
The postmodern question arises as we begin to recognize that we
are not in fact those autonomous, rational observers in the way that
our early constitutional system and those enlightenmeit figures be-
hind it presupposed. Locke's letter on toleration contains his model
of how churches are started.' 6 The individual looks over all of the
religious claims that exist in the world and decides which of those
are true and then goes around and finds a bunch of like-minded
11. Harold J. Berman, Introductory Remarks: Why the History of Western Law Is Not Writ-
ten, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 511, 512.
12. GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 473 (rev. ed. 1950).
13. See Hall, supra note 3, at 489 n.175, 494-97; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1430-31 (1990).
14. William G. McLoughlin, The Role of Religion in the Revolution: Liberty of Conscience
and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 197, 199-
200 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds., 1973).
15. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD I (Mortimer J. Adler et al. eds., 1990).
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individuals and forms a church.16 Now, I suggest to you that so long
as our picture of what religious freedom means is founded in that
kind of modern, enlightenment, rationalist picture of what religious
communities are about, we will be unable to arrive at a satisfactory
arrangement to protect religious freedom by constitutional means,
because the kind of freedom that is presupposed in that image sim-
ply does not exist. Part of the problem of our modern consciousness
is we know that freedom does not exist.
The critical question, I suggest, now becomes whether we are go-
ing to jump from that modern position of rational autonomy all the
way to Stanley Hauerwas's position that no freedom exists. 7 Are we
going to go all the way from a picture of complete rational auton-
omy to the suggestion that there is no such thing as religious free-
dom, that we are simply constituted by the narratives that make us
up as persons, and that we are bound to that reality in which we
find ourselves? If you go all the way from the modern question to
Hauerwas's postmodern question, freedom becomes irrelevant ex-
cept as a key to a kind of hermeneutic of suspicion. That is to say, if
you believe that we are not free in the way Hauerwas thinks we are
not free, what you do when you hear people talking about freedom
is to look around to see what sort of coercion they are covering up.
In the postmodern perspective, the idea of freedom, since it cannot
be coherent in itself, has to be a key to a hermeneutic of suspicion in
which you assume that people who talk about freedom are really
trying to cover up some kind of coercion.
I would myself - in good, moderate, Aristotelian fashion - try
to come down somewhere in the middle between the modern and the
Hauerwasian position. I prefer to speak of a relative or a situated
freedom that recognizes that we are shaped in inescapable ways by
the communities and the histories with which we start and that also
acknowledges that we are able to get a critical distance from those
starting points. Having that distance, furthermore, is crucial to our
own flourishing as persons, and also to the flourishing of the institu-
tions and communities in which we are born. An adequate under-
standing of religious freedom would thus take seriously both the
nurture of those communities of religious identity and the need to
formulate and live one's individual distance from those formative
16. Id. at 4.
17. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief" Is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 110 (1992).
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demands.
Time does not permit me to develop exactly what a jurisprudence
based on that idea of freedom would look like.18 The point is that
just as Bryan Hehir stated that the question of church and society
has to come before the question of church and state, 9 the question
of the nature of human freedom has to come prior to the question of
the legal status of religious freedom. If we want to ask in contempo-
rary terms whether the First Amendment is hostile to religion, the
best answer I can give is to say that the First Amendment and its
jurisprudence are going to work against religion unless we can come
up with a legal conception of human freedom and its social context
that is adequate to contemporary religious and philosophical under-
standings of persons and their communities.
18. 1 say, "Time does not permit me," with the implication that if time did permit, I would of
course be able to do this adequately. I confess that I cannot; but I think you see the point.
19. J. Bryan Hehir, Church-State and Church-World, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 175, 175 (1992).
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